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BOOK REVIEWS

The International Monetary Tangle: Myths and Realities. By
Guillaume Guindey. White Plains, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.,
1977. Pp. 121, $10.00.
An analysis of the post-World War II international monetary
order - initiated by the Bretton Woods Conference in 1943,
disturbed by the dollar's devaluation in 1971, and partially
restored by a system of floating currencies - is a task requiring
total comprehension of the economics of international exchange
rates, credit flows, and the gold standard. In The International
Monetary Tangle: Myths and Realities, Guillaume Guindey
demonstrates that it is possible to explain this perplexing system
within a relatively few number of pages. While the book presents
its own intellectual tangle, it is within the nature of international
monetary economics to be a complex subject to grasp. Guindey
presupposes that the reader has a rudimentary understanding of
the Bretton Woods system and sufficient insight into international economics. His intent is not to explain the functions of the
system nor to predict the future of the next international
monetary order. Rather, he propounds the reasons which caused
havoc within the system from 1943 to 1971 and advances a
number of lessons to be gained from this experience.
In the first part of the book, Guindey remains objective,
outlining historically the development of Bretton Woods and its
subsequent disintegration. However, the discussion is tinged with
bitterness towards the U.S. and its role in the system's collapse.
This underlying temperament explodes, almost to the surprise of
the author himself, in the chapter entitled "The Ambiguities of the
American Position." American monetary "egocentrism," in his
view, is one of the primary causes for the Bretton Woods failure.
Part One is an historical overview of international monetary
cooperation separated into three distinct periods: 1943-1958 with
the Bretton Woods Conference and the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); 1958-1971 as the period of
disintegration and collapse, and; 1971 to the present with the
initiation of floating exchange rates. A brief summary of the
objectives of Bretton Woods identifies the essentials of a
successful monetary order such as the avoidance of quotas and
other trade barriers, surveillance of exchange rates short of
control, and most importantly, "a system of mutual support to aid
countries in balance of payments difficulties." (P. 6). The IMF was
established as the embodiment of these objectives and functioned
to coordinate international monetary policies without violating
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the sovereignty of each member nation. However, problems were
apparent from its conception. The reconstruction of a devastated
Western Europe required immediate attention and the U.S.
accepted the role of financial advisor, thus, reserving a special
place in the system for the dollar. This event was followed by the
fixing of the gold price below market parity which protected the
price at which the dollar could be converted into gold.
European monetary cooperation was revived after Bretton
Woods to encourage European integration. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the European Payments Union (EPU),
and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC) focused on needs of the European financial community in
relation to the remainder of the world. Unfortunately, competition
with the IMF and the U.S. abandonment of active support after
the completion of the Marshall Plan deemed these organizations
ineffectual and subsequently, no viable alternatives were proposed.
The major financial centers of the international community
united in the 1960's to resolve the mounting problems facing
international monetary transactions. Known as the Group of Ten
(later to become the Group of Eleven),' this "club" wrestled with
issues such as the shortage of international liquidity. A "gold
pool" was created in which "banks proposing to buy [gold],
instead of competing with each other, would. divide among
themselves, according to a rule of thumb, whatever amount the
state of the market permitted to be bought without destabilizing
the price." (P. 32). By 1962, it was apparent that the short-term
indebtedness of the U.S. had brought about the notorious
"Eurodollar" due to the increased demand for dollars on the
European market. The Group searched for an alternative reserve
which could universally be used in financial transactions.
Consequently, in 1968, the Fund created the Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs) for accomplishing the purpose of establishing an
internationally controvertible reserve currency.
The devaluation of the American dollar by the Smithsonian
Agreement in 1971 marked the end of Bretton Woods and the
initiation of floating currencies. The value of the dollar fluctuated
sharply between 1971 and February 1975 causing the European
currencies to react in a similar manner. With the exception of
1. The Group of Ten included Belgium, Britain, Canada, the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States.
Switzerland subsequently joined to make it the Group of Eleven.
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Great Britian and Italy, the EEC countries instituted a grouping
of currencies, referred to as the "snake," by which each nation's
currency would be maintained within fixed margins when
fluctuating against each other but would move as a group in
relation to the dollar.
This disjointed effort to stabilize the international monetary
system was an attempt to build confidence throughout the
international community. In January 1976, the Jamacian Conference was held during which the IMF pledged increased assistance
to members, the SDRs were given new reserve value, and the role
of gold as a reserve was de-emphasized through the campaigning
of the United States.
While the preceding academic discussion is essential to an
understanding of the international monetary order, Guindey's
evaluation of the lessons of Bretton Woods in Part Two should be
read closely as it provides an analysis of the inherent problems of
any international monetary order, in essence, the author's advice
for future founders of another international monetary system.
Guindey insists that the collapse of Bretton Woods was a product
of a disunited international community whose sporadic attempts
to cooperate and solve the many monetary problems could not
overcome the instabilities caused by the volatile gold standard,
the growing Eurodollar, and ultimately, the international economic policies of the United States.
Speculation has intensified in a search to delegate the blame
for the failure of Bretton Woods. Guindey contends that the
primary cause of the monetary disorder was U.S. insistance on
keeping the gold price well below the market price so that the
dollar would retain its competitive edge. Furthermore, he charges
the U.S. with the encouragement of this disruption by refusing to
pay its debts in anything but dollars, thereby increasing
Eurodollar reserves and aggravating the disparity between the
true market price of gold, the established price, and the inflated
value of the dollar.
Another myth has evolved in reference to the IMF, its
exchange rate policy, and the collapse of Bretton Woods. It is
claimed that the Fund's policies were too rigid, discouraging
changes in exchange rates. However, Guindey reminds critics that
the IMF could only encourage changes in currency rates. Had the
Fund ever dared to directly propose or force a change, members
would object to the interference as an invasion of their national
sovereignty. "The clearest lesson from the past in these matters is
that changes in exchange rates not accompanied by a policy
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capable of eliminating the causes of disequilibrium in the balance
of payments run a strong risk of proving powerless to reestablish
any durable equilibrium." (Pp. 74-5). It was thus the IMF
member-nations' responsibility to recognize and change their
policies, not that of the Fund's.
In the final chapters, Guindey outlines many solutions to the
past international monetary crisis which apparently were attainable during the era of Bretton Woods but never utilized. A system of
controlled floating currency could have been an alternative to the
Bretton Woods system had the latter failed to function properly.
The other international monetary organizations such as the BIS,
the OECD,and the Group of Eleven could also have coordinated
their domestic policies to regulate credit flows and reserve
movements. The question remains as to why these solutions were
never adopted. The principal responsibility is relegated to the
United States whose distaste of foreign dependency prevented the
use of deficit aid from the IMF and credit from other countries,
especially Western Germany and Japan.
Guindey accuses the Americans of monetary "egocentrism" in
his description of U.S. international economic practices during the
Bretton Woods era. The U.S. was a self-sufficient entity which
claimed it could manage its own fiscal and monetary affairs
without external pressure. Furthermore, it was unconcerned with
balance of payments fluctuations and the accumulation of
Eurodollars. Independence restricted U.S. reliance on foreign
reserves, financial obligations, and participation in international
monetary organizations other than the IMF which it often
pressured to achieve its own designs. After this emphatic attack,
Guindey admits that
[W]e have carried to an extreme - perhaps almost to the
extent of caricature - this description of the 'egocentric'
attitude .... It seems, nevertheless, to be one of the causes
of the current confusion in international monetary affairs, of
the instability of exchange rates, and of the disorder in the
gold market. American policy during the last few years has
been a factor in the disintegration of Western Europe (Pp.
114-15).
The author concludes with a formula for a future international monetary order. He is convinced that the best system for
determining exchange rates should be based on the Bretton Woods
objectives with a provision permitting a "temporary recourse" to
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controlled floating if necessary. The IMF should continue to play
a leading role with the great financial centers faithfully communicating with each other to support the system. Finally, the U.S.
should begin to incur debts in currencies other than the dollar and
change its "egocentric" policies as to allow a new symmetry
between the dollar and other currencies.
Guindey provides the substance with which to comprehend
the post-war international monetary system and to foresee the
problems of the future. His assertion of U.S. responsibility for the
Bretton Woods collapse during the midst of the economic crisis
reminds all that opinion formed through hindsight is always
relatively accurate. Perhaps a greater allowance should have been
made for human nature and the immediately perceived economic
exigencies at that time. Nonetheless, The InternationalMonetary
Tangle: Myths and Realities is a worthwhile book to tackle for
those who welcome concentrated efforts to understand a subject
central to the cohesive operations of the international community.
Karen A. Murphy

